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ABSTRACT
A Comparative Analysis off Church and State 
Issue Attitudes In The United States and Norway
by
Bryan A. S. Rasmussen
Dr. Ted G. Jelen, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study looks at the effect that the relationship between church and state has on 
the people of Norway and the United States. It is a study o f political culture and 
socialization that compares the role of the established state church in Norway to the 
"Wall of Separation" that exists in the United States.
Public opinion data is obtained from the World Values Survey and presented in 
terms of the current Accommodationist/Separationist debate. The most important variable 
in determining issue attitudes turns out to be whether or not a person attends church 
regularly, and not their denominational identity. The study also shows that while the 
established church is an effective as a direct agent of socialization, it seems to quell 
religiosity. On the contrary, the religious marketplace promotes religiosity, while limiting 
Christianity’s ability to socialize.
at
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America, once considered a “Great Experiment’', has 
enjoyed a great deal of success over its 225 year history. This title refers to the bold new 
direction that its founding fathers charted in the late 1700s. These men formed a 
democratic system by putting the power in the hands of the people and separating church 
and state. The system they created remains one of the most stable and secure 
governments in world history.
Norwegians constructed a similar document in 1814. Their Constitution created a 
similar democratic system, but did not separate church and state. Instead, they maintained 
their traditional state church. What effect has this difference had on the relative success 
of these two political systems? Should religion be a factor in politics? If so. what role can 
it play in a democratic system that derives its power from the people?
In today's world, we continue to redefrne the role of religion in a democratic 
government of people over people. In the past, governments gained their legitimacy from 
difrerent sources. Among these were social class, military might and wealth, just to name 
a few. The most common source o f legitimacy was the concept o f a divine right given to 
a monarchy. Many governments in the past, and some today, claim their authority derived 
from a higher power. This authority gives credence to their leadership and power. The
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American and Norwegian governments, on the other hand, get their authority from the 
Constitution and, ultimately, from the people.
The goal of religion is to bring people to God. Therefore, how does religion 
logistically operate within a society to accomplish this goal? Traditionally, the primary 
roles of religion in a society are to maintain order and promote positive, communal 
values within the cultiue. Religion tries to accomplish this in two ways. The rirst step is 
to get the attention of the public. The best way to do this is to motivate people to attend 
church and believe in “God." In doing so, religion creates an audience for its message. 
This is defined as promoting Religiosity in this study. The next step is to effectively 
communicate with, or socialize, the people in that audience. The people need to hear a 
clear message from the church and behave accordingly in order for religion to be an 
effective agent o f socialization.
British philosopher Francis Bacon wrote that the four pillars on which 
government stands are religion, justice, counsel and treasure. ‘ Religion is a core pillar of 
a civilization because it explains the unexplainable. It gives a people a common set of 
beliefs concerning the meaning o f life. In the words of Samuel P. Huntington, “O f all the 
objective elements which define civilizations... the most important usually is 
religion..."' Because many people consider religion very important in their lives, 
inferring God's will can be an incredible motivator. For obvious reasons, this could also 
be a dangerous weapon in the wrong hands. God's word must be inferred with a great 
deal of integrity.
Both countries in this study are predominately Christian. At the same time. 
Christianity operates very differently in Norway than it does in the United States. How
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does Christianity operate in the United States and Norway? Is it an important part of 
either political landscape? Should it be?
Many observers, like Alexis de Tocqueville, have attributed the success the 
United States has enjoyed to political and non-political factors alike. Tocqueville 
mentioned a number of cultural factors that made America exceptional in its early years, 
including religion.^ One of the first things we leam in school is that the United States is 
“one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.’'* In the beginning, 
government support aided the universal acceptance of Christianity in this country that 
Tocqueville would observe. Accommodationists argue that government should still 
promote religion in America. As American culture has expanded, however, the issue has 
become more complicated.
O f course, government accommodating Christianity while respecting 
denominational differences is not the only view of the First Amendment. Many believe 
the goal of the establishment clause should be to eliminate government support of 
religion in the name of tolerance. This view holds that since the two are completely 
incompatible, they should remain separate. In the current debate, these people are called 
Separationists. Those who favor a “positive neutrality” position concerning chiurch-state 
relations are Accommodationists.^ I will go into more detail on this debate in Chapter 2.
In recent decades, the law o f the land has gone the way o f the Separationists. 
Legislators on local and national fronts have responded to concerns about prayer time in 
public schools and the displaying of Christian symbols on public lands during the 
Christmas season. The Supreme Court, the official interpreter o f our Constitution, has 
leaned towards a Separationist approach to the establishment clause o f the First
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Amendment. This trend began with Everson v Board o f Education o f the Township o f  
Ewing in 1947. (This was the case where the Supreme Court officially sanctioned the 
term “Wall of Separation” coined by Thomas Jefferson for the first time)^ While not 
every decision has gone the way of the Separationists. the trend has built momentum 
through decisions like Lemon v Kurtzman in 1971 and Lee v Weisman in 1992.  ̂It has 
come to the point where Separationists look to the court to counter any 
Accommodationist legislation that might make it through Congress.^ Over the past 
decade, the court, led by its conservative majority, has moderated its stand, but remains 
relatively separationist.
Norway will provide an excellent contrast for us to study. A Catholic state church 
helped pull together much o f Scandinavia around 1(XX) AD. The state church became 
Protestant in 1537. The Lutheran state church in Norway remains dominant nearly 5(X) 
years after its establishment.
At this time, 85 % o f Norwegians belong to the Lutheran church. The church 
plays a ver>' active role in Norwegian politics. A majority of the representatives in 
government belongs to the church. In addition, the government works hand in hand with 
church leaders in forming policy. The church leadership is made up of three groups: The 
Bishops' Conference, a National Council, led by a lay person and the Council of State, 
headed by the King.
These church groups play a large role in determining public policy. In particular, 
policies concerning social issues, like gay rights and abortion, rely heavily on church 
support. The result is the enlarging of the gray area between religion and politics as 
church leaders and government representatives strive to speak with one voice. This is a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
very different situation than is found in the United States. Studying attitudes toward 
religious issues in the two countries will provide us insight into the opposing ideas 
concerning the role of religion in politics.
The United States remains a religious country when compared superficially to 
other democracies despite, or perhaps due to. the separationist trend. Statistics show 
church attendance high and religious issues create a great deal o f debate in the political 
arena.^ The 1980's saw a resitfgence of religious conservatives in American politics. 
However, instead o f mobilizing support and reversing this trend toward separation, these 
groups found most Americans unreceptive to their orthodox message. In many cases, they 
were forced to redefine themselves just to survive. Religious conservative groups took on 
a more secular appearance and resorted to pleading for the same free exercise protections 
given to Atheists in Malnak v Yogi in 1977.'°
Discussing religious issues in this country seems to be encouraged, as long as they 
are not discussed in religious terms. As the Supreme Courts “Lemon Test" says, public 
religious activity is Constitutional if it first has a secular purpose." This case set a 
powerful precedent that took us one step closer to being a secular nation.
Norw ay, on the other hand, does not seem to be a country of highly religious 
people. While most people profess church membership, only 3 percent of the population 
report weekly church attendance. Religious issues are debated openly in the public sector, 
and in religious terms. The following example shows the role of the church in the public 
debate over a social issue.
Over the past decade, the issue of gay rights has been hotly debated in Norway. 
The people have been looking to the church for direction on the issue. In 1995. the church
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Synod, the highest-ranking representative body in the church of Norway (led by the afore 
mentioned National Council), voted to uphold the tradition of not employing openly gay 
individuals. In 1999, they voted to reconsider the issue. Since that time, the government 
has appointed a Church Affairs Minister who favors equal rights and opportunities for 
gays, and the King has ceremoniously honored Norway’s first champion of gay rights, 
Karen-Christine Friele. In addition, the first openly cohabiting gay priest. Jens Olsen, was 
appointed to return to the altar. While the Bishops continue to debate the issue, the 
softening of their stance has led to a tidal wave of changes in church and government 
policy. As we will see later, these changes also reflect in public opinion.
The United States is a unique situation because it is a nation built on diversity and 
promoting the rights of minorities.'" While Norway is a small nation with a very 
homogeneous culture, people from all over the world have come to the U.S. seeking 
freedom and liberty. What may have originally been religious competition between 
minority Christian sects has expanded, primarily since World War IL to include Muslims, 
Hindus and other faiths from around the world. Our government evoking even the most 
general Christian principle can now be seen as infringing upon the rights of these 
minorities.
One potential benefit o f this diversity is religious competition. Many argue that 
the separationist tendency has promoted competition between faiths for membership, 
resulting in a heightened religiosity among the public. While this may be true, does it aid 
religion in its attempt to influence people ethically? If the debate is between Lutherans 
and Catholics, in that case Christianity wins either way and gains a great deal of 
exposure. If the debate is between Christians and Atheists, as we have seen more o f in
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recent decades, Christianity stands a chance of losing. As government is allowing these 
debates, what role, if any, should it play in moderating them?
The question concerning the role of Christianity in American and Norwegian 
politics is a difficult and complex one. I have only touched on a few of the issues 
involved. In the interest of full disclosure, I now tell the reader I begin my research with a 
somewhat Accommodationist view. I have concern for the future o f our “Great 
Experiment” given the current trend toward Separationism. If we shy away from the 
values our system was founded on, specifically those Christian values, I believe our 
system will lose some of its order and legitimacy and our nation will fade into history. I 
believe the establishment clause was just that, a promise that the U.S. would never 
establish a state-church. I do not believe the free exercise clause was designed to stifle the 
voice of Christians and give special protection to Atheists. In my opinion, we have gone 
too far by reading the Amendment as the court currently does.
Many of our founding fathers ambitions were secular in nature: capitalism and 
democracy, among others. There is a heated, ongoing debate as to the religious views of 
our “founding fathers” that will likely never be resolved. George Washington said that 
“reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in 
exclusion of religious principle.” '^ Some o f them, like James Madison, seemed to change 
their views significantly over the course of their lives. Thomas Jefferson may not have 
been Christian at all. but he and John Adams definitely agreed on the importance of 
religion in maintaining a society in their letters.'^ Jefferson, himself, occasionally 
accommodated Christianity into government policy to maintain order while he was 
President.'^
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In the 1840s. Tocqueville observed that in America “Christianity itself is an 
established and irresistible fact which no one seeks to attack or defend.” '^ While I do not 
agree with every observation Tocqueville made o f the American people. I believe this 
one was accurate at the time. While I realize it is a controversial stand. I am among those 
who believe the founding fathers recognized Christianity, in general, as a pillar on which 
our nation was built. It was not until the mid 20* century until non-Christian religions 
became significant a factor in the American cultiue.
I do recognize the value of “giving unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and giving unto 
God what is God’s.” I believe there is a place for science and technology in our culture, 
as they have played an invaluable role in our development as a nation. I also do not want 
God or the church corrupted by politics, or politicians evoking God’s will for less than 
honorable ambitions. Obviously. God’s word is open to any number o f interpretations, 
which can create confusion and tension. However. I believe there is a way to keep 
Christian values guiding the system without infusing too much of the church.
In the end, I see American democracy requiring two essential elements for it’s 
continued prosperity: A respect for the strong Christian foundation we have and eternal 
vigilance by the citizenry will keep the leadership moving forward and keep America 
strong. Not only do we seem to be turning away from Christianity as a foundation of our 
system, but all signs indicate diminishing political participation in recent decades as well. 
I intend to address the problem of participation by teaching my students a sense o f civic 
duty, and I intend to try to find the proper role of religion in government though my 
research.
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The question about the proper role of religion in politics is not limited to certain 
religions or civilizations. Each religious tradition has a different defined role in society, 
and each country interprets that role differently. A  complete answer to the overarching 
question concerning religion in politics would address the proper role o f Islam in 
Pakistan, Shinto in Japan and Catholicism in Poland. For countless reasons, a macro 
solution like this seems unachievable. Instead, I begin my research in this field with a 
micro study of the U.S. and Norway that have different interpretations of the role of the 
same religious tradition in government. While I acknowledge that my current, 
unsubstantiated opinions got me interested in this topic. I am hopeful that this research 
can provide me some true insight into the current separationist/accommodationist debate 
within this narrow context.
Due to the individualism found in Protestant Christianity, it does not lend itself to 
a church-state system in the way that Catholicism and Islam do.' ‘ Despite this, a number 
o f Eiuropean countries, including England and Norway, do have a Protestant state church. 
As our system has provided, this will not happen in the United States. The Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution would never allow it. Besides, which 
church would it be? While Christians make up a significant majority, no single 
denomination represents anything close to a majority of the population. The debates in 
the United States instead center on how much Christianity should be accommodated by 
government.
As I have noted, ciurent jurisprudence in the United States favors increased 
separation of church and state. If our leadership were to change direction toward greater 
accommodation, the question would be how to begin. Although the first 100 years of our
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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nation featured a great deal o f accommodation of Christianity by our government, 
changing times would require a fresh approach.'^
President George W. Bush is promoting a plan to allow churches to help distribute 
social welfare. This plan makes sense to Accommodationists, as churches often do 
whatever they can to help those in their communities anyway. Religious Separationists 
oppose the connection this policy would forge between public programs and faith-based 
institutions. They believe churches might become dependant on government funds, and, 
therefore, subject to government intervention. Irreligious Separationists have a more 
fundamental objection to the policy. In any case, this program proposal is a reversal of 
the recent trend and faces sharp criticism on many fronts. Only time will tell if this 
program will be successful and a tinning point for this debate.
If we were to take a more Accommodationist approach, how would it work? 
Which values should be promoted? Different sects clearly have different priorities.
Would a church be better off by having a partnership with government to easier 
implement its values and policies on the people? Alternatively, do politics corrupt the 
church? Is government better off using the church to cement its legitimacy ? On the other 
hand, does a church-state alienate the religious minority to the point of resistance?
Other non-Christian religious minorities must be considered, as well. To assume 
Hinduism or Islam do not have any values that would strengthen our culture is flawed. 
Many of the core principles in Christianity can be found in other faiths and philosophies. 
Sometimes we also teach these principles as secular. Although “Thou Shall Not Kill” is 
one of the Ten Commandments, murder is also condenmed in other religious and secular
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circles. Does it have more impact as a religious tenet versus a secular teaching? Does it 
matter which religion teaches it, and in what political context?
I have decided to see if  I could research the impact o f religion on political culture. 
I will compare the U.S. and its strong separationist culture with Norway, a nation with a 
state church. My goal is to analyze the impact of these two systems of government on 
their citizen’s attitudes concerning ethical issues. I hope to find out whether an 
established church does a better job socializing the citizens, or if non-establishment 
improves socialization by creating religious competition. In the end, hopefully I will be 
able to draw some conclusions about how some level of separation might benefit the 
Norwegians, or how some level of accommodation might benefit Americans.
The data set in use here. The World Values Survey, gives a strong and accurate 
view of public opinion in Norway as well as the United States. Norway’s Constitution 
was written just after that of the United States, and it reflects many of the same 
principles. Norway is a Western industrialized nation with a high standard of living, and 
the most popular religion is a version of Protestant Christianity: specifically. Evangelical 
Lutheranism. In many ways, the United States and Norway are very similar. This will 
help me draw conclusions about the independent variable that I am using: The state 
church versus the Wall o f Separation.
There are. however, significant differences between the nations. I will need to 
remain mindful of these as I analyze the data. The United States is a heterogeneous 
society of nearly 300 million people, while Norway is a very homogeneous society of 
less than 5 million. In Norway, most people are ethnic Norwegian and nearly 90% belong 
to the state church. Norway maintains their monarchy and its rich history. Their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Parliament uses proportional representation and coalitions to govern the nation. The 
current government is a minority coalition of three parties from the middle o f the political 
spectrum.
While the United States is able to project leadership. Norway’s small population 
and strategic location have forced it to ally itself with others. Norway’s traditional friends 
include its Scandinavian brothers (primarily Sweden and Denmark). England, the United 
States and NATO. Recent oil discoveries have given Norway some financial freedom, but 
as the rest of Europe moves toward integration. Norway must decide how long it can 
avoid EU membership.
It is obvious that not all differences found in the political cultures of these two 
countries can be tied to the independent variable I am studying. These countries have 
different histories and traditions, as well as different issues currently shaping their 
attitudes. I was very careful to select questions from the survey that could be easily linked 
to my independent variable. However. I am willing to recognize the possibility of other 
forces being at work. In any case. I am hopeful Norway will work well along side the 
United States for this project.
Chapter 2 will review history and establish the parameters for this research. I will 
give an overview of the evolution of religion in politics and political culture theories, and 
a review of current literature in the field. In Chapter 3 .1 will analyze the data. I will 
legitimize the World Values Survey as my data source, and review the process of 
selecting data to use.
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Chapters 4 and 5 will be an analysis of the data from Norway and the United 
States after a brief historical analysis puts these numbers in context. In the end. Chapter 6 
will allow me to draw some conclusions from this research.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Political Culture and Socialization
In the broadest sense, this is a study in political culture and socialization. While 
research into the role of religion in politics can overlap into other social sciences, like 
sociology, psychology and anthropology, this study will focus on political issues 
surrounding church and state relations.
The concept of political culture developed from general theories outlined by Max 
Weber and Karl Marx. While Marx focused on the economic infrastructure of the society 
and its ability to guide culture, Weber looked at the role culture plays in legitimizing 
authority. Many authors would build on these theories and apply them to other fields of 
research.'
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba would build on Weber’s work and be the first 
to specifîcally define and apply political culture in The Civic Culture, in 1963." They 
defined political culture as “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, 
and evaluations of its population.” Each country has its own set of mores that define it. 
For example, Americans tend to agree on concepts like capitalism, democracy and 
hreedom. The importance we place on these concepts, and the way we define events in
16
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terms of them, help define us as a culture. We truly believe America is “the land of 
opportunity.”
I can not overstate the importance of political culture in a democracy. According 
to Almond, a country's political system has a symbiotic relationship with its culture. In 
such a large Republic, there needs to be some agreement on basic principles to avoid 
chaos. The United States government is very stable because it enjoys a great deal of 
deferential support from its citizens. Another way to describe this concept is that 
American culture is very consensual in its support of the governmental system and the 
current regime. An American's idea o f a revolutionary change in government (a policy 
shift like a 1.6 billion dollar tax cut) is very different than an Afghani's (complete 
overthrow of the current regime and/or form of government). There is a respect for otur 
government instilled into Americans at a very early age.
This culture is perpetuated by political socialization. To continue quoting Almond 
and Verba: “People are introduced to (political culture) Just as they are socialized into 
nonpolitical roles and social systems. "  ̂Political socialization is the way we, as members 
o f a society, develop our views toward the society and otû  roles in the society. The 
people and institutions that help us with this development are agents o f socialization. 
These agents can include (but are not limited to) family, friends, government itself and 
the media. One way we are socialized to give so much deferential support to the 
government is by saying the Pledge o f  Allegiance before school when we are young. In 
this example, the school is an agent o f socialization because of its role in our 
development.
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Political socialization is not an exact science. There are many agents at work, 
sometimes pulling a person in opposite directions. While many agents can play a role in 
development, some agents are certainly more effective than others are.
Two factors can explain an agent's effectiveness. First would be the agent's 
ability to tap deep emotion. If a father loses his job because of government cutbacks, the 
disappointment is going to influence his son's views about the size of government more 
than a story on the news about someone else losing a job. Due to the intimacy 
exemplified here, many people consider family to be tmong the most important agents of 
socialization.
The other factor has to do with whether the socialization was direct or latent. 
Manifest, or direct, socialization would be a person thinking or doing something because 
they were told to do it by a person with authority over them. Latent, or indirect, 
socialization results in a person doing something because people and events over the 
course o f their life have convinced them that this is the right thing to do. The distinction 
is in the method o f delivery. Debates continue as to which one of these is the more 
effective method.
The political culture in the United States is very different than in Norway.
Norway maintains a Monarchy, and the Utdted States does not. The multiparty 
parliamentary system in Norway creates a much different dynamic than the two party 
presidential system in the United States. Voting rates are higher in Norway, and our data 
will show considerable differences in political issue attitudes between the cultures.
As I detailed in Chapter 1, there are many possible explanations for these 
differences. The one I am going to explore is the different role that Protestant Christianity
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plays in the political systems. The central role of religion as an agent of socialization is 
key to understanding the importance o f this study.
Religion In Politics
Religion is undoubtedly able to access the emotional core of an individual. In The 
Clash o f Civilizations, Samuel Huntington makes the argument that religion is, and 
always has been, a defining element o f a civilization.^ Oiu* religion goes a long way 
toward defining who we are and what we believe as individuals and as a society. There is 
little debate that religion has the intimacy necessary to be an effective agent o f 
socialization. There has been a great deal of debate, however, as to whether it should 
have a more direct or latent role in the public sector.
Religion is of great importance, not only due to the depths of its influence, but 
also because of the different ways it can affect a person's development. Certainly, 
religion can be a direct agent through the church and the different religious documents 
available to read. However, it can also be an indirect agent, acting through parents or 
friends. The religious views of one's parents have a great impact on development, 
whether the individual is aware of it or not.
In the United States, church and state are separate. While there is Christianity 
present in government symbols and proceedings, the state does not act as one with the 
church. In this way, religion does play a socializing role through our government system, 
but it is more of a latent role.
On the other hand, Norway maintains a state chttrch. In this system, government 
and religion are supposed to speak with one voice. Here, religion has another institutional
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agent of direct socialization besides the church. This difference is the independent 
variable for this study. Is religion is a more effective agent of socialization acting directly 
through the state church or indirectly as one o f many influences on the separatist system 
in the United States?
Historical Review
There is very little in the Bible to help us determine the proper role for 
Christianity in politics. Jesus spoke very little about politics or political issues. He was 
more interested in individuals and their relationship to God than he was in the order and 
structure of society.^ It was not until 330 AD that Roman Emperor Constantine the Great 
recognized Christianity as a legitimate religion in the Empire. Soon after that, the 
writings of St. Augustine established the superiority of the Christian Church over any 
government of men. and Christianity became the official religion of the Empire.^ From 
that time oiu for a government to be effective, it would have to consider using the church 
to maintain its authority. This idea would gain momentum going into the Middle Ages, 
when state church governments were common in Western Europe. St. Thomas Aquinas' 
concept of natural laws, the fact that laws get their legitimacy from God and not from 
men. furthered this tie between church and state in the 13* century.^
With the invention o f the printing press in 1454. many people had access to their 
own copy of the Bible for the first time. The Gutenberg Bible would naturally reduce the 
role of the church in religion and bring God closer to the people. The Protestant 
Reformation of the 16* century presented religion as a more individual concept. Martin 
Luther led the charge to end corruption in the chtnch by reducing its authority.^ While he
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downplayed the role of the organized church, he could not dismiss it. as he needed an 
organizational structure in order to disperse his message. Protestant doctnne would still 
make use of a church organization, but the focus would be more on the individual’s 
relationship with God.
The Enlightenment would follow with its liberal ideas about individual freedom 
and self-determination. John Locke adapted Aquinas' concept o f Natural Laws to that of 
individual Natural Rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit o f property In addition,
Locke, Thomas Hobbes and other liberal philosophers promoted the idea that government 
would no longer have to gain its legitimacy from a divine right; it could get it from the 
governed. These ideas opened the way to dividing church and state and the formation of 
democracy.
The trend toward individual freedom and liberty continues 300 years after the 
Enlightenment. The end of the Cold War reinforced these ideals throughout the world as 
many former communist nations try to establish a democratic system and fight to connect 
with their religious traditions. One might wonder, however, if individual freedom and 
liberty can be taken too far. Hobbes certainly feared a state o f nature driven by individual 
self-interest. W ithout a common sense of cultural mores, would chaos not ensue? Adams 
and Jefferson certainly thought this would be the case, and placed religion in high regard 
for its value as an agent of socialization. °
Only an individual can decide what role, if any. they want religion to play in their 
lives. Whether to believe in God and attend church is a decision each of us must make for 
ourselves. What has been shown here, however, is that common religious values are very 
important for a society. Religion helps maintain social order, one of the essential
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
responsibilities of government, and promote cultural values. The question is; What role 
should government take in promoting religious values?
Accommodationists vs. Separationists
The first amendment of the United States Constitution says that the “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof...” "  The second Article of the Norwegian Constitution reads: “ 1. All inhabitants 
o f the Realm shall have the right to free exercise of their religion. 2. The Evangelical 
Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the S tate...” '" Both Constitutions 
have a free exercise clause. The focus of this project is the difference in the two 
establishment clauses.
In today's literature, scholars in the United States approach the establishment 
clause in one of two ways. Ted Jelen labels these two schools of thought 
accommodationist and separationist.'^
Accommodationists are those who believe religion has a place in government. 
They are not necessarily calling for a state church in the United States, but they believe 
religion is good for social order and cohesion. Therefore, they believe religion, in 
general, not any one specific sect. should be promoted by government. The term used to 
describe the accommodationist position is “positive neutrality" Government should not 
promote one religion over another, but it can promote religion over irréligion.'^
In the case of the United States. Accommodationists believe Christianity ties us to 
our traditions and puts a foundation beneath our laws (the Natural Law concept), values 
and customs.'^ They are concerned that current trends in the public sector and the courts
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indicate our government is moving away from the Natural Laws and Rights our founders 
promoted. In addition to the Everson and Lemon decisions I cited earlier, 
Accommodationists point to a series of court decisions in the mid-1960 s as throwing out 
the concept of Natiual Law in favor of a more relativist approach: legal positivism.'^
On the other hand, Separationists believe religion does not have a place in 
democratic govemmenL Their basic argument goes back to my point about the depths of 
emotion religion can sununon. Religion does not have a place in politics, because politics 
in a democracy is essentially about compromise and religion is about truth (at least 
perceived truth). James Madison wrote in Federalist 10 that religion could be a dangerous 
source of faction in a society due to the conviction of its adherents.'^
Separationists do not have to be anti-religion. There are some that are, but many 
of them are very religious and feel that any bond between church and state would corrupt 
the church with money and the politics of compromise. Religious Separationists also 
believe that religious liberty can only exist with complete separation, as government 
influence in religion is likely to result in government control o f religion. In the 
introduction, the question was raised how government could accommodate and promote 
general religious principles without favoring one sect above ail. Separationists do not 
believe this scenario can happen. They believe that government involvement with 
religion would siu’ely lead to government control over religion.
While there is a tendency for an Accommodationist to be religious, a 
Separationist could be either religious or irreligious. Data shows that Americans have 
more confidence in churches than in government, and many Separationists want to keep it 
that way.'®
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Religious Competition vs. The Canopy Model
Over the years, political scientists and sociologists have tried to develop models 
to explain the relationship between religion and politics. Each model tries to isolate the 
effect of the relationship between church and state on the individual citizen. The two 
major theories currently in play are the Religious Competition Model and the Canopy 
Model.
In 1967. Peter Berger, developed a theory of a “sacred canopy” provided by either 
an established church or one with a strong majority.'^ The idea is that this chiu’ch would 
effectively be able to set the mores for the culture. Even those citizens who are not a 
member of the established church would find themselves at least somewhat agreeable to 
its decrees. The chinch would create a commonality and unity among the citizens.
Catholic priest and political philosopher Richard Neuhaus built on Berger's model 
in 1984: “...whether it is called the Judeo-Christian ethic, or Christianity... it is the 
dynamic of religion that holds the promise of binding together a nation in a way that may 
more nearly approximate ci vitas (the ideal state).”
For example, in Italy, where Catholicism is the established religion, the Catholic 
Church would have a strong influence on the attitudes of all Italians under this model. 
Even an Italian non-Catholic would likely be more conservative on an issue like abortion 
than he or she might be if (s)he lived in another country.
The Canopy Model can be used to support the Accommodationist view. While 
they are not pushing for a state church in the United States. Acconunodationists believe 
added accommodation o f Christianity by government would strengthen the ethics o f all
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citizens, Christians and non-Christians alike. Accommodationists also believe it is 
possible to do this without promoting one individual Christian sect over another.
The negative side to this model is called the Lazy Monopoly Theory. In this view, 
the established church, as a monopoly, looses its motivation to appeal to the citizenry. 
Professionalization o f the clergy takes place and the church gets out of touch with the 
people."' Should this occiu', the church would lose its ability to effectively socialize, and 
would likely face resistance.
Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox tested the Canopy Model on countries in Eiurope 
with limited success. Their preliminary data did show an increased level of liberalism 
among Catholics in countries with vast Protestant m ajorities." While this study was not 
conclusive, it did provide an example of the Lazy Monopoly theory.
To provide another illustration, say the above mentioned Italian Catholic Chiuch 
decides that since it does not have to compete for members, and it can focus its energies 
on educating the clergy for intellectual debate. The lay person is left out as the Priest 
he/she feels closest to is always gone to seminary. This lay person is then likely to fade 
away from the church and, possibly, its teachings. This individual might also be recruited 
by a minority sect that shows more life and dedication to helping bring people to God. 
Suddenly, the established church is losing its grip on the population, and other churches 
begin to threaten its dominance.
This lazy monopoly approach is more likely to take place with an actual 
established church that has no significant competition. However, some would argue it has 
taken place diuing certain periods in United States history.^ For the Canopy Model to
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work, the majority church must ignore the temptation to rise above and ignore the 
average member.
The other model is the Religious Competition Model. The most complete work on 
this model is The Churching o f America, written in 1992 by Roger Finke and Rodney 
Stark. This work paints an image of a very religious America, driven by competition 
among sects. Finke and Stark show a high level of religiosity in America and attribute it 
to this free market. This book is a historical analysis of the gradual increase o f religiosity 
in America from 1776-1990. At times when one church dominated, they show that 
religiosity decreased temporarily. Eventually that chinch would get lazy and the others 
would compete harder for membership. Religiosity would then increase as the different 
sects got closer in numbers."^ Stark has co-authored a number of journal articles in 
support of the Competition model.
The book presents a convincing argument concerning the history of religion in 
America. It acknowledges the dominance of Christianity that Tocqueville observed in the 
1830*s, while documenting the battles between the denominations. Finke and Stark then 
review the introduction of other faiths into America in the early 1900’s and analyze their 
impact.
According to this model, competition is a key to promoting religious behavior, 
like attending church and professing a belief in God. The more open and competitive the 
market is. the more the individual churches focus on communicating with their members 
to keep them actively involved, and reach out to the people in hopes to recruit.
The Religious Competition model fits nicely into Jelen's account of the 
Separatioitist view. The Separationists believe that bringing religion and politics together
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would naturally result in one sect being favored over the others. If government stays 
completely separate, religions will be allowed to compete freely with each other for 
membership and ideas.
The goal of this project is to analyze two political systems and try to discover in 
which system religion can be a more effective agent of socialization. These models could 
help us a great deal. If the United States fits into the market analogy and Norway fits the 
Canopy model, they will provide an excellent structure to help analyze the data. Is 
religion a more effective agent on a nation's political culture as a direct agent, in a 
church-state system following the canopy model? Alternatively, is it more effective in an 
indirect role, as voices competing in a pluralist system?
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CHAPTERS 
THE DATA
The World Values Survey
The data source for this research project is the World Values Survey. The current 
version is a compilation of three waves of survey research. The European Values Survey 
group between 1981 and 1984 coordinated the first wave. The World Values Survey 
group and the European Values Survey group between 1990 and 1993 coordinated the 
second wave. The last wave of surveys was coordinated by Ronald Inglehart. et al., for 
the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), from 1995 
through 1997. Dr. Inglehart. of the University o f Michigan, also assembled and 
documented ICPSR 2790 in February 2000. This compilation was used for this project.
The compilation data set worked well for my research. My goal was to get a 
general snapshot of attitudes in these two countries. Certainly, some attitudes have 
changed over the past twenty years, and these trends show up very well in a comparison 
of one wave to another. For example, the data shows attitudes toward homosexuality in 
the United States becoming more liberal between 1981 and 1995. (See Appendix 2) This 
is consistent with other data available of public opinion in the United States.'
30
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These trends, though interesting and represented well by the data set, are only 
mentioned as one verification of the reliability of the data. Some consistencies and trends 
will be mentioned later, but they are not the focus of this project. When I take an average 
of the three phases, however. I am able to find out what I really need to know: Attitudes 
toward homosexuals are more liberal in Norway than in the United States. (Table 3.2)
The biggest benefit to using the compilation is that it helps overcome possible 
aberrations in the data. The most glaring problem in the data is that Catholics in the 
United States are over-represented. The overall sample includes 39% Catholics and 32% 
Protestants (Table 3.2). In reality. Protestants oumumber Catholics in the United States 
by about two to one."
The big problem is with the 1981 wave that included 58% Catholics (Table A 2 in 
Appendix 2). This data set indicates that there is a religious sect that represents a majority 
of Americans. If this were true, it would change the whole purpose of this study. This 
research project is based on the fact that there is not a majority religious sect in the 
United States. For this reason. I could not have used the 1981 data set alone. Instead, the 
compilation allows me to use the data. Catholics are still over-represented, but there is no 
majority religious sect in the United States. While 1 must apologize for this error in the 
data, my concern is not the percentage of Catholics vs. Protestants, that information can 
be obtained from other places. My concern is their attitudes, and my sample size is big 
enough where I have some leeway on the representation, as long as they are all minority 
sects.^
One option I considered was to leave out the 1981 sample. While this would have 
reduced the sample size and the value of the results, it would have been necessary had the
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1981 data been abenant due to the overrepresentation of Catholics. Table 3.1 shows the 
1981 sample to be reliable. The table shows averages of coded responses for four 
variables. Respondents were asked specific questions concerning attitudes toward 
abortion and homosexuality. The other two variables are issue scales created for this 
project. I will detail those variables in the coming pages. For now. notice that the overall 
attitudes show consistent trends over time in American culture, and the Catholic data 
mirrors the overall data. In all data shown in this report, a lower number indicates a more 
conservative, or a more religious response, as defined by the potential answers to the 
questions. Defining what or who is “religious” could be a complex task. For purposes 
here, the answer comes from answers to the basic set of questions that will be in the 
Religiosity issue scale. The same logic applies to the conservative/liberal distinction. The 
Catholic data is generally slightly more conservative than the overall sample. This makes 
sense, since the overall sample includes all of those who claimed no religious affiliation. 
For this reason, and those mentioned previously, the data set proved reliable, despite the 
oversampling of American Catholics.'*
Table 3.1
American Attitudes Over Time
* Attitudes on... 1981 1990 1995
Religiosity 1.58 1.55 1.44
Orthodoxy 1.15 1.17 1.15
Homosexuality 1.32 1.49 1.64
Abortion 1.61 1.72 1.70
American Catholics Attitudes
Religiosity 1.51 1.44 1.31
Orthodoxy 1.11 1.13 1.12
Homosexuality 1.26 1.46 1.69
Abortion 1.61 1-62 1.57
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The Questions
The survey was made up o f 235 questions (or variables), designed to get at 
everything from demographic information to attitudes about politics, religion, work, 
family, capitalism and democracy. Questions were selected out o f the survey that fit into 
one or more of the following categories: Attitudes on religiosity, orthodoxy, political 
party, political interest, general ethics, sexual ethics, capitalism and denominational 
identification. A full review o f the 34 questions used and how they were recoded is 
available in Appendix 1.
The first thing to do was establish the validity of the data set. The commonly held 
theory that Americans, on the whole, are more religious than many of their European 
counterparts was supported by the data (Table 3.2). While Catholics were over­
represented in the American sample, the breakdown was relatively accurate in the 
Norwegian sample. The fact that Americans are more orthodox in their beliefs and 
Norwegians are more liberal about homosexuality and abortion is consistent with other 
data and scholarly observation.^
Attitudes on...
Table 3.2
Basic Statistics 
U.S. Norwav
Religiosity 1J3 2.19
Orthodoxy 1.16 1.54
Abortion 1.67 2.01
Homosexuality 1.46 1.82
Percentage of...
Catholics 39 0.7
Mainline Protestants 32 87
Nones 12 3
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Once the validity o f  the data and the compilation is established, the next step is to 
create subgroups for analysis. The independent variable is the religious landscape in 
Norway and the United States. The dependent variables are the attitudes that form the 
political cultures o f the two countries.
The first groups to be isolated from the rest of the World Values Survey were the 
respondents from the United States and Norway (V2, or variable 2, equals 11 or 18). 
Within each sample, I then used question 179 to separate out Mainline Protestants, 
Catholics and "’Nones” (Nones could be irreligious or non-denominational). In 
discussion on Norway, the "Mainline Protestants” are limited to the Evangelical Lutheran 
Chiurch only, so we just call them Lutherans. For the piuposes of this project, all other 
responses to question 179 were set aside. These groupings were to be used as dummy 
variables because there are only two possibilities. In other words, either a Norwegian 
individual is Lutheran, or they are not. I will compare all Lutheran to all non-Lutherans, 
all Catholics to all non-Catholics, and so forth.
The next step was to create issue scales concerning issue attitudes. The goal was 
to combine a number of questions in the survey into categories to represent attitudes. 
Once the categories were established, tests were run to see how reliable these categories 
were. In other words, do people respond in a consistent manner to the different questions 
in each category? There were six issue scales created, all with relatively strong reliability 
coefficients in both the United States and Norway (Table 3.3). The following is the name 
of each category, and the questions that were used to form it (For exact wording and 
coding, see Appendix 1 ).
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Religiosity
o How important is religion to you? 
o Are you an active church member? 
o How often do you go to church? 
o Would you say you are a religious person? 
o How important is God in your life? 
o Do you get comfort and strength from religion ?
Orthodoxy
o Do you believe in God? 
o Do you believe in life after death? 
o Do you believe people have a soul? 
o Do you believe the devil exists? 
o Do you believe in hell? 
o Do you believe in heaven? 
o Do you believe in sin?
Capitalism
o Should government take care of people?
o Is competition good or harmful?
o Is success due to hard work or luck and connections ?
Ethics
o Is claiming a benefit you did not earn justifiable? 
o Is avoiding bus fare justifiable?
o Is cheating on your taxes justifiable?
o Is buying something you knew was stolen justifiable?
o Is accepting a bribe justifiable?
Sexual Ethics
o Should you be able to enjoy complete sexual freedom ? 
o Is homosexuality justifiable?
o Is prostitution justifiable?
o Is abortion justifiable?
o Is divorce justifiable?
Political Interest
o How important is politics to you?
o Do you ^scuss politics with your friends?
o How interested are you in politics?
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Table 3.3 
Reliability Coefficients
Variable U.S. Norwav
Religiosity .844 .827
Orthodoxy .896 .829
Capitalism .402 .582
Ethics .515 .730
Sexual Ethics .672 .713
Political Interest .470 .517
The strength o f the reliability coefficients was very pleasing. As expected.
Norway showed more homogeneous on most issue attitudes than the United States as 
reflected by the higher reliability coefficients. This made the results in Religiosity and 
Orthodoxy, where the coefficients for the U.S. were higher, remarkable.
The relative strength of the Religiosity variable is especially important. That issue 
scale will be used in combination with the dununy variables created out of the religious 
denomination variable (V179) for extensive bivariate analysis with interaction. The fact 
that the issue scale is so reliable and consistent between the two countries will provide a 
strong foundation for the results.
The coefficients for Capitalism and Political Interest were relatively weak. While 
they are still usable, it is interesting to note the inconsistency in the responses to these 
issue scales, which only consisted o f three questions each.
The data provided by the World Values Survey proved to be valid. The issue 
scales created to analyze the data have proven very reliable. The next step is analyze the 
attitude and try to determine the best role for religion in Norway and the United States.
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At this point. I would hypothesize that the United States will continue to be more 
conservative on issues than Norway. Should this be the case, it would appear, at first 
glance, to show the Competition model to be more effective than the Canopy model at 
socializing attitudes. As with most Social Science research projects, however, it is 
unlikely the final analysis will be that simple.
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CHAPTER4
NORWAY
Historv of Norwav
Certain Norwegian traditions go back for centuries, and are very entrenched in 
their culture. Both their Monarchy and the church-state system can be traced back to St. 
Olav, a Christian who united Scandinavia during the Viking Period, around 1000AD.'
The Norwegian Constitution was written in 1814, when Norway began a 91-year 
union with Sweden. Since it was patterned after that of the United States many of the 
concepts and much of the language is similar." Norway amended their Constitution after a 
liberal movement in 1884, and gained complete independence from Sweden in 1905. 
Their original Constitution, as with the American one. remains viable and stable to this 
day.
The Norwegian Constitution makes the Evangelical Lutheran church the official 
church of the land. It requires the King and over half of his Council of State, made up of 
the Prime Minister and top advisors, be Lutheran. The members who are not Lutheran 
can not attend a vote on church business. The King ordains all religious activity in the 
nation, and the citizens who are Lutheran are bound to raise their children in the same.^
Despite all of this, their Constitution does have a  free exercise clause. Based on 
the United States Constitution and tradition, an American might find these two clauses in
39
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conflict. How can freedom of religion be obtained without freedom from religion? In 
Norway, the people seem to be comfortable that they have done just that. The data will 
show members of minority religions to be relatively accepting o f the situation.
One possible explanation for the success of this arrangement is the homogeneity 
o f the Norwegian culture. Even so, there is currently a great deal o f debate on the issue in 
Norway. The Lutheran church, which claimed close to 95% of the population just 25 
years ago, is now down close to 85%.'* The Norwegian Parliament voted to maintain the 
state church in 1981, but make it slightly more autonomous. About three years ago, the 
church, concerned with the trend o f lowering membership, created a commission to look 
in to church-state relations. Their report is due early in 2002.^
Norwegians are concerned with many of the same social issues that Americans 
are. Some of these issues include low political participation, ethics, gay rights and 
abortion rights, just to name a few. However, there is a big difference with how these 
problems are being perceived and dealt within the two cultures. In Norway, the Lutheran 
church takes a leadership role in developing public policy.
As an example, it is appropriate to revisit the gay rights issue in Norway. When 
the government wants to consider gay marriage issues, the Lutheran church is directly 
involved. The King is the symbolic Head of State and the head of the church. The 
Council of State, led by the King, the Bishops and the National Council are all very 
involved in making public policy directly, not just church policy.
Sometimes the church leadership influences public policy by creating internal 
church policy. When the church hires a gay priest, that sends a message to government 
that leads to a shift in public policy as outlined in Chapter 1.
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Currently, Norwegians have very liberal attitudes toward gays by an American 
standard. Same sex unions, a legal marriage not recognized by the church, are allowed in 
Norway. Recent debates have centered on hiring gay priests and other behavior that 
implies church acceptance o f homosexuality. The state church arrangement implies 
church acceptance of homosexuality if the government, representing society, accepts it.^
This is only one example of the liberal issue stands taken by the Norwegian 
government and the Lutheran Church. On other fronts, abortion laws allow a woman 
under 16 to have an abortion without parental consent. Freedom of religion extends to 
giving Muslims the right to broadcast their call to worship, "azan”, throughout city 
streets. The Norwegian newspapers are full of social issue debates taking place far to the 
left of similar debates in the United States.
Is the government leading this charge toward liberal issue attitudes, or is it the 
church? It is hard to tell since they are supposed to be speaking with one voice. Is the 
state church leading the people in this direction, or is it driven by public opinion? In any 
democracy, this question is debatable. It usually works out to be a combination of the 
two. Seeing how these questions require extensive research beyond the frame of this 
project. I feel comfortable saying I do not know the answers. Still, even if I can not 
identify the driving force behind the attitudes, the does not reduce the value of studying 
these attitudes that define their political culture.
Here is the public opinion data from Norway. It is time to analyze how attitudes 
are effected by religion acting as a direct agent o f socialization through the state.
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Data on Norway
The Survey provides a strong sample o f Norwegian opinions. The World Values 
Survey surveyed 5706 respondents in a country of a little over 4 million people. Due to 
the relative homogeneity o f the country, most of the results were statistically significant. 
Sometimes the most interesting results were the exceptions.
The first thing that was tested is the correlation between the Norwegians 
confidence in government and confidence in the church. In other words, if someone has a 
high level o f confidence in the government, how likely is this person to have a high 
conHdence in the church. At .20 (n = 1127, p = .000), this correlation is high, but not as 
high as one might have thought given the state church.
The Religiosity scale is an important part o f this study. It consists of one objective 
variable, church attendance, and several variables that are more subjective. Church 
attendance has traditionally been the most useful question in determining religiosity. Our 
issue scale combines this with a number of more subjective questions to give us a more 
complete picture.
The next fact to establish is that Norwegians, as a whole are considerably less 
religious than Americans. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Norwegians score 
considerably “less religious" on the Religiosity issue scale than Americans (2.19 for 
Norway vs. 1.53 for the United States). Of course, one o f the questions in that scale 
pertains to church attendance, where only 3% of Norwegians attend church regularly 
compared to nearly 50% of Americans. This did not account for much o f the difrerence, 
however. When this question was removed, and the more subjective measures of
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Religiosity remained, the difference was still intact (2.12 for Norway vs. 1.47 for the 
United States).^
Table 4.1
Religion to Religiositv Correlation (Norway)
Catholics Lutherans 
Religiositv______ .13***_______ .16***
In Table 4.1, we used the complete Religiosity issue scale described in Chapter 3. 
This is the first usage, however o f the dummy variables created out of V I79, isolating 
Catholics and Lutherans. The table shows that Catholics are significantly more likely to 
give religious answers to questions in the issue scale than non-Catholics. The tendency is 
stronger when Lutherans are compared to non-Lutherans.
These data in Table 4.1 challenge the lazy monopoly theory. The theory would 
hold that Lutherans would be less religious and that Catholics, because they are the 
minority, would be more active in their faith. That is not represented here. Although 
Catholics are .13 more likely to be religious than non-Catholics, the Lutherans are up at 
.16. This indicates that the established church is doing a good job keeping its membership 
relatively active and involved.
The following Table 4.2 represents correlations between religion and issue 
attitudes in Norway. The table is divided into “Nones'* (3% of the sample). Catholics 
(0.7% of the sample) and Lutherans (87% of the sample). In Norway, the “Nones" consist 
o f primarily the irreligious. A negative correlation indicates a tendency toward
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conservatism in ethics, laissez- faire in economics and high levels of political interest.
The higher the absolute numbers, the stronger the relationship.
As I alluded to in Chapter 3, the dummy variables represent “None s" vs. “non- 
None’s", Catholics vs. non-Catholics and Lutherans vs. non- Lutherans. The goal is to 
determine if, for example. Catholics have more consistent attitudes toward Capitalism 
than the entire collection of non-Catholics.
Table 4.2 
Correlation Coefficients (Norwav)
Issue category None Catholic Lutheran
Capitalism .05** -.002 -.05**
Ethics .04** .01 -.06***
Sexual Ethics 18*** -.08*** -.09***
Political Interest .01 .02 .002
The first thing that shown in this data is that there is no significant correlation 
between religious faith and level of political interest in Norway. This fact would, again, 
counter the lazy monopoly theory and support the canopy model. Catholics or None s are 
not participating in politics in droves to change the system. Nor are they boycotting 
politics because they see themselves as the neglected minority. There is no correlation.
Actually, the numbers are mostly inconclusive about Catholics, except that they 
tend to be conservative on sexual ethics issues like homosexuality and abortion. This 
follows when one considers the Catholic Church's stand on these issues combined with 
the afore mentioned liberal stand of the Norwegian church-state.
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The primary difference this table represents is the conservative tendencies o f the 
professed Lutherans versus the liberal tendencies of the Nones. Attitudes toward 
capitalism, general ethics and sexual ethics all provided significant data for this 
conclusion. The most powerful example is, again, sexual ethics. There is a tendency for 
both Catholics and Lutherans to be conservative on this issue, but the tendency for Nones 
to be liberal is at least twice as strong (.18 versus .08 or .09). This would indicate that the 
important distinction in determining issue attitudes at this level is not between sects of 
Christianity, but between religious and irreligious. The difference between .08 and .09 is 
hardly worth mentioning, but the difference between -.085 and .18 is distinctive in both 
size and direction.
It is not surprising that the correlations are weaker after you break it down by 
denominational affiliation when one considers what is being compared. In reality, it is 
remarkable that so strong a tendency can be found when Lutherans are being compared to 
everyone else (The None s and the Catholics, the religious and the irreligious, etc.). It 
does make sense that the Lutherans would be more conservative than the non-Lutherans, 
because the latter group includes the None's. However, on Sexual Ethics, the Lutherans 
actually had a slightly stronger conservative pattern than the Catholics (.09 to .08). This 
is true despite the Lutheran church's liberal public stand on these issues and the Catholic 
Church's conservative stand.
The next table takes this theory a step further. The first column o f Table 4.3 
represents a correlation between the Religiosity issue scale and the others. The goal is to 
look for tendencies in responses as subjects get more religious. The number in the first
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column of the second row indicates that as Norwegians get more religious, they are .17 
more like to give conservative responses to Ethics questions
The next step proved to be a bit more complex. Using the religiosity variable, a 
bivariate correlation with interaction analysis was performed. Interaction was computed 
between religious affiliation and Religiosity, and then the correlations from Table 4.1 
were recomputed. The Religiosity issue scale had to be changed into the dummy variable 
necessary to perform this interaction. To do this, I discovered the mean of the responses 
to the Religiosity issue scale as a whole (for example, it was 2.09 among Norwegian 
Lutherans). I then isolated those subjects whose responses averaged more religious than 
the mean. This interaction isolates religious members o f one denomination from the rest 
of the sample. The goal was to recognize tendencies in attitudes among the more 
religious subjects among the Lutherans and the Catholics (Table 4.3).
To clarify, look at the number in the last colunan of the second row of Table 4.3.
In this case, religious Lutherans, those who scored more religious than the average 
Lutheran on the Religiosity issue scale, are pitted against everyone else (Both non- 
Lutherans and less religious Lutherans alike). The goal is to see if this group (which is 
actually about 48% of the sample) shows any tendency in their responses when compared 
to the rest of everybody. The result shows that Religious Lutherans are more likely to 
respond in a conservative way to the questions in the Ethics issue scale by .03. This 
number is similar to the one representing the entire Lutheran sample on Table 4.2.
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Table 4.3
Bivariate Analysis (Norway)
Issue category_______ Religiositv Cath/Relig Luth/Relie
Capitalism -.06** .(XXH -.(X)4
Ethics -.17*** -.07*** -.03**
Sexual Ethics -.39*** -.12** -.07***
Political Interest____ -.13***______ -.05***______ -.08***
This time, the data overwhelmingly showed the key factor in determining issue 
attitudes was religiosity in general. Someone who scored high on the religiosity variable 
was .39 more likely to have conservative attitudes on Sexual Ethics issues like abortion 
and homosexuality. The numbers down the column, while not nearly as strong, all tend 
toward conservative attitudes and are all significant and meaningful.
The Political Interest results were remarkable as well. Although no significant 
relationship was evident in this category on the earlier table, here adding religiosity in 
makes a big difference. A person, who scores high on religiosity, is .13 more likely to be 
interested in politics. This fact reinforces earlier data about the positive correlation 
between confidence in chinch and government (If we assume that those who are active in 
politics have more confidence in the institutions than those who are not).
Once it was broken down into denominational categories, the correlations became 
weaker across all issues. This shows that general Religiosity is a stronger predictor of 
issue attitudes than the religiosity/affiliation interaction. The Capitalism numbers are the 
most obvious example. On Table 4.2, None s tended toward less free market by .05. 
Here, religious Norwegians were .06 toward laissez-faire. This is a clear distinction, but 
when it was broken down by affiliation, the correlations became insignificanL
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However, as with table 4.2, it is important to remember what is being compared.
It is actually very interesting to note that religious Lutherans (actually 48% of the sample) 
tend to be .07 more conservative on Sexual Ethics issues than less religious Lutherans 
and all non-Lutherans put together (Down from .09 for all Lutherans). This conservative 
tendency is even stronger (.12) when religious Catholics are isolated (Up from .08 for all 
Catholics). The Ethics results came out similar, just less pronounced. The liberal stand of 
the Lutheran Church on abortion and gay rights is a likely explanation for the increasing 
consistency among Catholics and the decreasing consistency among Lutherans.
In the Norwegians case, the Religiosity issue scale presents them as a slightly 
more religious people than the church attendance figure alone does. This is evident by the 
mean on the Religiosity issue scale getting more religious when the church attendance 
question is removed (2.19 down to 2.12). On the one hand, this could be seen as 
obscuring the objective data that can be obtained. However, if  the Canopy Model is found 
to fit the Norwegian religious landscape, this subjective data could provide confirmation 
that Norwegians are content in their faith without being drawn to the institution regularly.
In the data. 5.1% of Norwegians indicated that they go to church once a week or 
more. Although this number is slightly higher than the ‘official' data, it is satisfactory to 
work with. In research, the most widely used method to estimate church attendance is 
survey research. The option o f asking the church is not a feasible one. Churches have 
been known to overestimate their numbers, particularly in competitive environments. The 
best way has always been to go out and count all the attendants individually. This 
eliminates a respondent's temptation to overestimate due to social deniability. However,
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this is clearly the least efficient method, and, as a result, is little used. As in this case, 
survey research usually provides sufficiently accurate results.
In any case, among Norwegian Lutherans in this sample, only 3% claim regular 
church attendance. Church attendance among Catholics was higher, at 4%, but not high 
enough to make a Lazy Monopoly argument. As before, when religiosity showed 
relatively similar between Catholics and Protestants, a one- percent difference in the 
church attendance figures does not present a significant difference. According to the Lazy 
Monopoly theory the Lutheran attendance figure would be much lower than the Catholic 
figure because the Lutheran church would be loosing touch with its membership and the 
Catholics would be rallying together as an oppressed ntinority. Instead, it appears the 
Canopy model idea o f universal contentment is closer to the truth.
Overview of Norwegian Results
The Religious Competition model says the lazy monopoly theory should have 
taken hold by now and the Lutheran Church should be struggling. This does not hold up. 
While only 3% of Norwegians attend church, a fact that could be associated with this 
theory, the Lutheran Church does a better job of promoting religiosity than the Catholic 
Church, according to this research. While the Lutheran Church has been losing numbers 
in recent years, it still claims over 85% of the population almost 200 years after the 
writing of the Constitution.
The Canopy Model does fare better, but there are still some holes. The impact of 
certain controversial church positions, like gay rights and abortion issues, on churchgoers
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seems to be limited. While the Lutheran Church seems to have pacified its members and 
its opposition, it is not effective at generating religiosity.
Two distinct conclusions can be drawn from these results. Rrst, the variable that 
most affected the results was religiosity. There were clear relationships in issue attitudes 
when we contrasted the religious to the irreligious. These patterns were significantly 
reduced when we looked at the denominational breakdown. To paraphrase; It matters less 
which religion a person belongs to, instead it matters more whether or not they are 
religious.
The problem for the Norwegian Lutheran church is that Norwegians are not 
religious. The low church attendance and their responses to the Religiosity issue scale as 
a whole evidence this. Certainly, the most effective way for a church to socialize is by 
promoting religiosity. However, this is not the only way a church can socialize.
In Norway, religion acts directly through the church and directly through 
government. Acting through the church can be more efficient. When a minister speaks to 
his congregation, he has the right answers. Many people will not question the wisdom of 
the man in the black robe reading from the Bible.
When religion uses the government to socialize, the process is going to take more 
time. Even an established church, with a direct connection to the people, is going to have 
to move slowly. This is because liberal democratic governments are built to work slowly. 
Endless debate and compromise will slow an ethical movement. However, having 
majorities throughout government, the Lutheran Church should eventually prevail in 
most debates in Norway. The question is will they compromise their principles in the 
process.
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The other conclusion that can be drawn is that religion can be effective at 
socializing issue attitudes with those individuals it reaches. Table 4.3 is a great example 
of this. All o f the numbers reflected attitudes that are more conservative for religious 
members of both faiths. The problem is, with 3% regular church attendance, the Lutheran 
Church does not reach many people directly.
Separationists in the United States might argue that it is the lack o f religious 
competition that results in the low church attendance and religiosity numbers in Norway. 
One goal of the current study being done concerning the state church is could be to 
determine how you can dramatically increase church attendance and religiosity without 
eliminating the state church. Still, while the church does not reach many people in this 
way, the state church system opens other possibilities for influencing public debate and 
socializing the masses.
Considering the church and the government work together to form public policy 
in Norway, the resulting policies and public opinion attitudes are a lot more liberal than 
one might expect. Statistics show things like abortion and euthanasia to be much more 
widely accepted in Norway than in years past.* Norwegian responses, in general, were 
more liberal than American responses. Norwegian laws are also more liberal on these 
issues than laws in America. The church position on these issues seems to fit right in.
In conclusion, it appears that the established church's role as an agent of 
socialization for religion in Norway is complex. With church attendance so low, religious 
leaders in Norway must find another way to spread their message. Their other direct way 
is though the government. Using this medium limits their ability to define specific issue 
attitudes. The church position is modified with political compromise and socialization
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can be a slower process. It does help religion play a role in guiding the overall direction 
o f the society, but is this role defined by religious doctrine, or by compromise and public 
opinion.
While a liberalization of attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality does exist 
in other countries over the past 15 years, in Norway the state church legitimizes this 
evolution and allows for quicker institutionalization o f the changes. The same sex unions, 
liberal abortion laws and a recent appointment of an openly gay priest are examples of 
these institutional changes.
As alluded to before in this Chapter, it is difficult to determine who the driving 
force is behind this liberal trend. When the church and the state speak with one voice, it is 
hard to know if they are in complete agreement or if one is driving the other. In addition, 
it is never easy to tell if  the church state is leading the people, or vice-versa. The point 
here is that the Lutheran church is playing a significant role in this process, but not in a 
traditionally conservative way. Whether they are leading or following, the church support 
for this trend legitimizes it in many ways. It even works to lessen the conservatism of the 
most religious members of the church.
Religious Separationists in the United States would argue that these liberal trends 
in Norway are a result o f  government corruption o f church principles. In essence, that if 
the church was left to its own devices, there is no way it would take such a liberal stand 
on these social issues. This is supported by the conservative attitudes of the religious 
Lutherans found in this research. One might wonder if the church's teachings on Sunday 
morning are in line with the liberal face it puts on to work with government on public 
policy. Once a church enters the political world o f debate and compromise, how much of
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“right vs. wrong" can remain? It appears that a religious Lutheran might be disappointed 
by the answer to this question.
In any case, time to shift the focus to the United States to see if the different 
church-state relationship provides different results.
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Central Bureau o f Statistics.
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CHAPTERS
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Data on the United States
In previous chapters, much of the debate over religion in politics in American 
history was covered. In addition, some issues under current debate were analyzed. In 
general. American attitudes toward many of the issues being discussed here are more 
conservative than Norwegian attitudes. Americans will show up more religious and 
orthodox, as well. American laws also reflect these conservative attitudes when compared 
to Norwegian laws.
Is this pattern a result of the Wall of Separation we have built between church and 
state? Does the Religious Competition Model explain these attitudes and give Separatists 
cause to claim victory? Specific analysis o f the data will answer these, and other, 
questions.
The Survey provides a sample of 3612 respondents in the United States. Since the 
U.S. is a more heterogeneous country, the results were not as tight as the results from the 
Norwegian data analysis. Fewer results were significant to .05, and, in general, the 
correlations were not as strong. Still, the data provided some interesting insight.
The correlation between American's confidence in government and confidence in 
the church was lower than the Norwegian result. This is to be expected, because o f the
55
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lack of direct connection between the two in the United States. However, at .12 it is still 
high (n= 3297, p= .000).
Table 5.1
Religion to Religiositv Correlation (U.S.)
Catholics_________ Mainline Protestants
Religiositv .04*________________ 0̂1___________
Not much can be determined from Table 5.1. The dummy variables are the same 
as in Table 4.1, with the exception that the Mainline Protestant variable does not include 
only Lutherans. Catholics are slightly more religious than non-Catholics, but not much. 
The same cannot be said about Mainline Protestants because the result is not significant. 
This would indicate that a number of people who claim to be Protestants are not very 
religious, and/or that a number o f people that claim another (or no) church affiliation are 
more religious (or spiritual). These numbers represent the difficulties in tying down 
patterns by studying the individualistic American culture. Interestingly, this is about the 
only time we receive significant results concerning Catholics in America.
In Table 5.2, like Table 4.2, the respondents are divided into “Nones" ( 12% o f the 
sample). Catholics (39% of the sample) and. in this case. Mainline Protestants (32% of 
the sample). This final category includes Protestant sects like Lutherans, Presbyterians, 
Methodists, Episcopalians and others. An Evangelical Protestant category was actually 
clearer to define in the United States than in Norway with sects like Southern Baptists 
and others. However, the category was left out o f the tables because it provided little 
useful information, and there was no comparable group in Norway.
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The “Nones" are a lot more complex a group in the United States. In Norway. 
“Nones" were the few people who specifically rejected the canopy of religion that the 
Lutheran church provides, and, therefore, likely religion in general. This is exemplified 
by the fact that 0% o f Norwegian "Nones" claimed weekly church attendance. They also 
scored very “low" on Religiosity (2.49) and Orthodoxy (1.73).
In the United States, it is more complicated than that. “Nones" could be 
irreligious people, but they could also be non-denominational Christians or belong to a 
variety of secular spiritual sects. As we will discuss later, the religious marketplace gives 
the individualistic American unlimited freedom to choose. Without government 
interference, an American can join any number of Christian denominations, or a non- 
denominational Christian church. He or she is free to practice Judaism, Islam. Hindu, or 
whatever religion they choose.
Still, we can conclude that the “Nones" represent the least concentually religious 
section of society. While American weekly church attendance remains around 50%. this 
group was at 11 % in the data. The "Nones ' also scored considerably “lower" on 
Religiosity (2.03) and Orthodoxy (1.29) than the general sample. "Nones" do include the 
Atheists and other secular groups. They also include the growing numbers of non- 
denominational Christians, who have shied away from traditional denominational 
Christianity for one reason or another.
The following Table 5.2, like Table 4.2, represents correlations between religious 
denominations and issue attitudes in the United States. To review, the dummy variables 
represent “None s" vs. “non-None's" (primarily irreligious vs. religious). Catholics vs. 
non-Catholics (religious vs. a combination) and Mainline Protestants vs. non- Mainline
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Protestants. The goal is to determine if, for example. Catholics have more consistent 
attitudes toward Capitalism than the entire collection of non-Catholics.
Table 5.2 
Correlation Coefficients (U.S.)
Issue Category None Catholic Mainline Protestant
Capitalism .08*** .001 -.05**
Ethics -.01 .02 .06
Sexual Ethics .10*** .02 -.05**
Political Interest - 06*** .02 .08***
As we saw with Norway, the essential factor that defines these results is religion 
vs. irréligion. In three o f the four categories, significant results could be obtained 
concerning the minority who claim no religious affiliation. They clearly tend towards less 
free market, liberal sexual ethics and they are more interested in politics. On the contrary, 
the same three significant results from the Mainline Protestants lean the other way 
(although not quite as strongly, which is to be expected). They have a slight tendency to 
want a free market economy, more conservative sexual ethics and a stronger tendency to 
want to stay out of political discussion.
What is very interesting is the fact that the Catholic sample provides no 
significant results on this table. Their tendencies on the table are very small and 
insignificant. This would indicate a great lack of cohesion among Catholics in America, 
and between American Catholics and the Pope. An example of this might be Catholic 
support for the Democratic Party in the United States, despite the party’s pro-choice
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platform. This is a complicated discussion for another time. For now, let us just conclude 
that the data represents a discombobulated Catholic sample.
This creates an interesting dynamic pitting the Protestants versus the Nones. This 
dynamic has been a major player in American politics over the past 20 years. ‘ The 
Political Interest numbers might be of interest to Protestant religious leaders. Those 
numbers would certainly help explain the Separatist trend in government and the failure 
o f the Religious Right movement to make a stronger impact in the 1988 presidential 
election. Aside from the Political Interest results, however, the American results had a 
striking similarity to the Norwegian results.
The first column of Table 5.3, like Table 4.3 in the previous chapter, represents a 
correlation between the Religiosity issue scale and the others. The goal is to look for 
tendencies in responses as subjects get more religious. The number in the first column of 
the second row indicates that as Americans get more religious, they are .26 more like to 
give conservative responses to Ethics questions.
Then the bivariate correlation with interaction analysis was performed, using 
the religiosity variable. Interaction was computed between religious affiliation and 
Religiosity by changing the issue scale into a dummy variable (the mean was 1.44 among 
Mainline Protestant Americans). By isolating those subjects whose responses averaged 
more religious than the mean, religious members o f one denomination could be isolated 
from the rest of the sample. The goal was to recognize tendencies in attitudes among the 
more religious subjects among the Protestants and the Catholics (Table 5.3).
To clarify, look at the number in the last column o f the second row of Table 5.3.
In this case, religious Protestants are pitted against everyone else. The goal is to see if this
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group (which is actually about 16% of the sample) shows any tendency in their responses 
when compared to the rest of the sample.
Issue Category
Table 5.3
Bivariate Analysis (U.S.)
Religiositv Cath/Relig Prot/Relig
Capitalism
Ethics
Sexual Ethics 
Political Interest
.03
-.26***
-37***
-.003
-.0007
-.08**
-.08***
-.07***
.01
-.02
-.05***
- . 10* * *
With a couple of notable exceptions, this table represents the same strong 
relationships for Americans that we observed with Norwegians. It matters less which 
religion one adheres to, the more distinctive variable is religion vs. irréligion. The 
tendency for religious Americans to have conservative attitudes on sexual issues is very 
strong. It is almost as strong as the correlation was in Norway. The correlation for the 
general ethics attitudes was even stronger than Norway. This is remarkable for such a 
large and diverse country to have more consistent attitudes than a small homogeneous 
one. This table reflects a high level of religiosity in America.
One explanation for this might be church attendance. Church attendance in the 
United States is very high in comparison to other western industrialized countries. Most 
sources put American attendance over 50%. According to the survey. 44% of Americans 
said that they go to church at least once a week. This broke down to 50% of Protestants 
and 49% of Catholics. The significant minority of Nones, who attend at 11%. brought 
down the total number.
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When the results were broken down by denomination, the ethics correlations 
lessened, as with Norway. However, the correlations were still remarkable when it is 
considered what is being compared. The religious Catholics were .08 more conservative 
on Ethics and Sexual Ethics than the rest of the population, including groups like less 
religious Catholics and Evangelical Protestants. Part o f this can be attributed to the 
presence of the “None s" in the non- religious Catholic group, but not much.
This is obvious when you consider the same numbers for the religious Mainliners. 
The Ethics result is insignificant, and the Sexual Ethics result is lower, at .05. What this 
shows is that the Catholic Church is doing a better job of socializing issue attitudes 
among its religious adherents than the Mainline Protestant churches. One possible 
explanation is that there is one Catholic Church delivering one message to its followers. 
At the same time, there are many Protestant denominations competing for membership. It 
is possible that the effort to differentiate the product has taken the focus away from the 
basic message of the Christian church.
Most o f the numbers on this table indicate, to varying degrees, that American 
Mainline Protestant churches usually send conservative messages to their followers. 
However, evidently this is not always the case. A look at the Capitalism data reflects no 
tendency among religious Mainline Protestants. Catholics, or the religious in general. The 
church is likely preaching the need to help the less fortunate, and some people seem to be 
reconsidering the concept of raw capitalism. What does this say about Max Weber’s 
“Protestant Ethic?" "
The other significant data on religious American Mainline Protestants and Catholics 
reflects a high level of Political Interest. This is interesting because the number
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representing all the American Mainline Protestants revealed the opposite, a significant 
trend toward less interest. This represents a division between Americans who are active 
in social organizations and those who are noL^ It also supports the earlier positive 
correlation between confidence in church and confidence in government.
It is interesting that a higher percentage o f Americans attend church every week 
than voted in the last presidential election. The data indicates a tendency for Nones and 
religious Mainline Protestants to be more interested in politics than other groups. This 
would indicate that a large percentage of the voters came from one of these two groups. 
This supports the None vs. Protestant dynamic that was discussed earlier.
One final table needs to be presented here to emphasize the point concerning 
denominational breakdown. Similar to the last table, this one represents a bivariate 
analysis. However, instead of using the entire Religiosity issue scale as a dununy 
variable, here we use church attendance only as the dununy variable to combine with the 
denominational variable.
Table 5.4
Bivariate Analvsis w/ Church Attendance (U.S. and Norwav)
Issue Attitudes... Cath/Attendance Prot/Attendance
Norwav U S . Norwav U S.
Capitalism n/a .002 .02 -.03
Ethics n/a -.08*** -.08*** -.08***
Sexual Ethics n/a -.17*** -.13*** -.17***
Political Interest n/a -07*** .01 -.07***
Since church attendance statistics are so different for the United States and 
Norway, an effort was made to isolate that variable from the other religiosity variables to
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see how that would effect the results. The data for Norwegian Catholics is unusable, since 
an insufficient number of them reported weekly church attendance on the survey. Aside 
from that, this table helps solidify trends already recognized.
All of the significant information on this table supports previous conclusions, but 
it is remarkable how clearly it does so. The correlations under Ethics and Sexual Ethics 
for both American Catholics and American Protestants are exactly the same. Political 
Interest for American Mainline Protestants and Catholics remains high. This result is also 
consistent with previous discussion. This table shows the ability of chinch attendance to 
promote Christian values regardless of the national church and state system or political 
culture. The conservative correlations are equal. The key seems to be getting people to 
church.
It is true that most o f the correlations were stronger when church attendance was 
used alone and not combined with the other variables in the Religiosity issue scale. On 
the other hand. Table 5.4 also clarifies the value of the more subjective measures 
included in the Religiosity variable. Table 5.4 shows no difference in issue attitudes 
among church-going Protestants in Norway and the United States. However. Tables 4.3 
and 5.3 provided some valuable information distinguishing religious Lutherans in 
Norway from religious Protestants in the United States.
Since 3% of Norwegians attend church regularly, it is safe to assume that there 
are more “religious" people in Norway than churchgoers. In this case, the issue scale 
provided valuable information, represented on Table 4.3. that is not available on Table 
5.4. This includes correlations on Lutheran Political Interest and Catholic views in 
general.
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In contrast, the dynamic is different in the United States. Higher church 
attendance figures in the United States can provide a good indication of who is religious. 
Churchgoers commit to their faith and hear the message on a weekly basis. Consequently, 
the correlations using attendance were stronger than when the religiosity scale was used. 
The religiosity scale allows those who attend church less often, but still claim to be 
religious, to influence the results. As expected, this works to reduce the conservative 
tendencies.
While Table 5.4 was included for discussion, the religiosity variable was used 
over church attendance for this study. This was necessary due to the comparative nature 
of this work. Due to the differences in church and state relations, the institutionalized 
church has a much different role in the two cultures. Using the religiosity issue scale 
helped level this playing field a little bit.
Overview of American Results
The Religious Competition model says that religious competition should provide 
for a religiously charged atmosphere in the United States. The data certainly shows that 
to be the case. Church attendance is high, and the religiosity and orthodoxy variables 
scored much higher among Americans than among Norwegians. How is this effecting 
Christianity’s ability to socialize the political culture in the United States?
As with Norway, the conservative trends on attitudes of religious people lessen 
when you look at Catholics and Protestants separately. In this case, it cannot be explained 
by a liberal stand on these issues by one certain church. Here, the data indicates that the 
breakdown emanates from a lack o f cohesion among Protestant Christian sects.
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Competition creates the desire to distinguish one group from the other. In 
American politics, the two political parties try to convince people they are very different 
when, in reality, they are very close to each other on the political spectrum. The same 
thing is occurring among Protestant Christian sects in America. To find significant 
differences between what a Lutheran and a Methodist minister preaches would not be 
easy. However, somehow these two denominations need to distinguish themselves in 
order to compete for members.^ This dynamic creates a lack of cohesion among 
American Protestants that we see in the denominational breakdown correlation 
reductions.
As far the American Catholics were concerned, a look at the whole sample did not 
provide many significant results, while a look at religious Catholics provided remarkable 
consistencies. This indicates that the less religious Catholics tend to struggle justifying 
the traditional conservative views of the Pope in light of current liberal views on issues 
such as gay marriage and abortion. Those who attend church more often are able to 
maintain their conservative views, while many o f them continue to actively support the 
Democratic Party.
Right now. the splintered Mainline Protestant groups are competing against a 
growing group of relatively cohesive and politically active “Nones.” While this total 
sample represented this group at 12% of the population, the reality is they are closer to 
20%. The problem in the 1981 data set discussed in Chapter 3 accounts for this difference 
(see Table A 2). This group shows strong trends toward liberal issue attitudes and a 
strong interest in politics. This creates a competition dynamic that was not found in 
Norway, where only 3% o f the sample were “Nones.”
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The large group of “Nones” shows another side of the Religious Competition 
Model. If an individual is asked to select between religious sects, it is entirely possible 
he/she might select “None Of The Above.” This is especially true in a nation like the 
United States, where concepts like freedom and individualism are so important to the 
culture. Many Americans do not want to be “institutionalized,” and they avoid organized 
religion.^ In a highly charged religious atmosphere, it is harder to defer denominational 
selection. Product differentiation becomes an increasingly important factor, further 
heightening religious competition.
In short, the Religious Competition Model seems to accurately describe the 
American landscape. However, it also seems to be hindering religion in its ability to 
socialize. Religious Americans are .37 more likely than other people to have conservative 
views on sexual ethics issues. If we just look at church going Protestant, that number 
goes down t o .17. Looking at religious Protestants, and Protestants in general, the 
correlation is a mere .05. The same pattern showed up in the analysis of the Ethics 
results. Whatever commonality of issue attitudes that might exist among religious 
Americans across the board is not reaching the religious or the casual Mainline 
Protestant, because the denominations are more interested in accentuating their 
differences rather than their similarities. The stronger tendencies among the religious 
Catholics reinforce this fact.
This is a very important observation about the state of religion in America today. 
Despite the high church attendance, in the end, there is little commonality among 
Mainline Protestants concerning ethical issue attitudes. This sample shows more 
commonality among “Nones” in attitudes concerning Capitalism and Sexual Ethics. It is
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true that when “None’s” are compared to non-“None’s’\  the primarily irreligious are 
being compared to the more religious. That should allow for some significant 
distinctions. It is also true that there are a number of Mainline Protestant sects in 
America. However, they all teach the basic Christian values found in the Bible. A “None” 
is, by definition, unlimited in the different attitudes or values he/she could possess.
The fact that the “Nones” appear to be more cohesive, on any issue attitude, than 
the Mainline Protestants, even the religious Mainliners, is remarkable even when it is 
considered what is being compared. In addition, the stronger consistencies among the 
religious Catholics reinforce the point. The Religious Competition in the United States 
results in religious particularism among Protestant denominations. This fact appears to 
have diminished the commonality of Christian values in the American political culture.
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Notes on Chapter 5 (Pages 55-67):
' There were many references to this forming dynamic in my research. One example was 
Jelen and Wilcox, 1995. Page 70-1.
'  Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism. (Routledge, New York, 
NY, 1999). Reference to the individuality he found in Protestant Christianity and 
capitalism.
 ̂Wald, Kenneth D., Religion and Politics In the United States, (St. M artin's Press, New 
York, NY, 1987). Chapter 2.
* Hnke and Stark. Pages 17-21.
' Bellah, Robert, Habits O f The Heart. (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1985). 
Reference to “Shilaism " concept outlined in this work.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSION
The first thing this study accomplished was to reinforce some established facts 
and theories in the context of a comparison between the United States and Norway. 
Church attendance rates in the United States are much higher than rates in Norway. In 
addition, Americans are more religious and orthodox than their Norwegian counterparts. 
Current theories placing a positive correlation between these two facts are not disputed 
by these results.
The next step was to see how religiosity proceeds to affect the socialization of 
issue attitudes. The established church in Norway seems to do a fairly good job 
socializing the few churchgoers quickly and affecting the rest of the population gradually 
by influencing public policy. The differing means have also resulted in very different 
ends. Churchgoers remain conservative, while public opinion and policy move to the left. 
To an extent, the Norwegians have established a successful religious canopy and 
managed to avoid most o f the lazy monopoly pitfalls. However, the Norwegian system 
does a poor job promoting religiosity among the people, especially if the objective 
measure of church attendance is used. In addition, the church has compromised many 
traditional positions in order to compromise with goverrunent in a public setting.
69
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In the United States, the “Wall of Separation” model seems to do a good job of 
promoting church attendance, religiosity and debate. Still, it is no better than the 
Norwegian State church in socializing, due to a  lack of cohesion in the religious message. 
Is there a way to improve the socialization ability by taking the strengths of the two 
systems and reducing the weaknesses?
Accommodationists and Separationists in the United States would both find 
support by looking at the Norwegian data. Separationists would say that the data 
illustrates their concerns about the effects of politics on religion. The Norwegian 
Lutheran church has moved far to the left of traditional Christian values due to its bond 
with government. In addition, many religious Lutherans maintain conservative views on 
these issues. Considering the low attendance and religiosity, religious Separationists feel 
the data on the Norwegian system would support their position.
Meanwhile, in the United States, religiosity and orthodoxy are high. Church 
attendance is higher than any other western industrialized country. Religious issues are 
debated constantly. People have complete freedom of choice when it comes to religious 
preferences. The size of the “Nones”, and their obvious influence on the political system, 
is a great example of that freedom. If lawmakers try to stifle that freedom, the court is 
usually quick to act. The Religious Marketplace seems to have worked very well. A 
Separationist argument would be easy to make based on these results.
A deeper look at the data presented here reveals a more Accommodationist 
argument. The American Accommodationist does not want a state church for the very 
reason that we see in Norway. Politics should not require churches to compromise their 
teachings as seems to have happened in Norway. Instead, the accommodationist believes
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government should promote religion without forging any official ties to any one specific 
sect.
Government can be a very good direct agent of socialization for religion. The 
Norwegian State church is playing a significant role in a liberal movement on ethical 
issues. How can this be modified to an accommodationist model in the United States 
without churches having to compromise their message? Can government promote 
Christianity, in general, without lifting one sect over another?
The data suggests that this is possible. In both countries, there was a strong 
tendency for religious people to agree on conservative ethical attitudes. This trend was 
reduced when we broke up the sample into Protestants and Catholics, but it was still 
significant. This “common ground” among religious people of all denominations would 
be the place to start reintroducing religious values into American society through 
government policy as well as promoting religion, in general, through rhetoric. The 
challenge would be doing survey research to define and test this “common ground.”
The most important conclusion found in this study is that the essential variable is 
religiosity. We found all o f the major distinctions in issue attitudes when we compared 
the religious to the non-religious, not the Catholics to the Protestants. This is true 
regardless of the standard used. In the United States, an individual had to score below 13 
on the Religiosity scale to be in the "religious half,” whereas, in Norway, the mean was 
2.2. A person scoring at 1.9 would be “more religious” in Norway and “less religious” in 
the United States. Despite the significant difference in how religious one has to be to get 
in the “more religious” groups used for Tables 4.3 and 5.3. the issue attitudes reflected in
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these groups are very similar. This speaks well of the sacred canopy o f the Lutheran 
church in Norway.
If this holds to be true in other research, the Accommodationist would say that 
there is definitely a place for government here. It could take a leadership role in forming 
a more cohesive religious environment by accommodating some basic, “common 
ground" religious values into government policy. It could also promote religiosity, in 
general, through govenunent rhetoric, as President Bush did in the weeks following the 
tragedies o f September 11***. 2001. The United States government might also consider 
presenting these values in Christian terms, since vast majorities of Americans are 
Christian.
There are two groups that are left out of this equation: The non-Christian religious 
minorities and the “Nones." The “Nones” present the biggest hurdle to the 
Accommodationist. They have been growing in numbers and influence for decades. They 
are a product o f the religious competition and individualism found in our culture, and 
they are hard to define. This group and the non-Christian religious minorities would have 
to believe that neither religion clause of the First Amendment was being threatened by 
accommodation. The Norway data proves that even an established church can exist 
without threatening the freedom of other religions under a free exercise clause. They 
would then have to accept the fact that the United States was founded on Christianity, not 
secularism, and remains a Christian nation to this day. All of this seems very unlikely 
based on the current political climate in the United States.
In the future, the debate between the Accommodationists and the Separationists 
will continue. It is my hope that this work will contribute to the ongoing debate. As with
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many studies in Social Science, the results can be used to support either side of the issue. 
If this project did not solve the debated issue, at least it explored the dynamics of the 
relationship between church and state in a way that had not been previously done.
From my personal view, I believe I now have a deeper understanding of some of 
the issues involved. At the end o f this project, I maintain my Accommodationist view. I 
agree with Samuel Huntington who believes that we should “keep America American.” 
We should not try to turn the rest o f the world into America, and, at the same time, we 
should not try to turn America into the rest of the world.®
I believe the United States was founded on Christian values, and that we can 
maintain those values in our political culture while tolerating anyone among us who 
believes something else. I do not believe any secular nation has the foundation necessary 
to survive in this world, and the more we separate church and state, the more we become 
a secular nation.
As for the fear the government cooperation with the church would result in 
government control over the church, the Separationists seem to have a point. The 
Norwegian data would certainly indicate that it might have occurred there. The key to 
avoiding this is to maintain the religious marketplace we have built by not lifting one sect 
over another. The only way to see if this is possible is to respectfully try it.
I believe the sacred canopy benefits Norwegian political culture. There seems to 
be sufficient democratic debate on ethical and church issues, without creating any kind of 
rebellious minority. The canopy creates yet another cultural commonality for a small, 
homogeneous people, adding a sense o f religious nationalism. Public opinion does have 
too big a role in determining church policy. However, the relationship does add quick
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justification to liberal aspects o f our social evolution that the chiurch usually inhibits. The 
biggest problem they face is church attendance. More participation at that level would 
free up church from government and allow the church to communicate more directly with 
the people. It will be interesting to note if this is the conclusion of the Lutheran church 
report that will be available next year. If it is the conclusion, the important thing they 
have to determine is how to do it. If there is another way to promote religiosity, besides 
religious competition, they need to find it.
With limited accommodation in the United States, I believe our government can 
promote Christian ideals without dominating the religious landscape. Religious 
competition can still flourish while our leadership reminds us not to lose track o f the core 
Christian values that are the foundation of our culture. Values like self-control, 
dedication, integrity, kindness to all. and the desire for peace can be reinforced by 
religion. I believe religion will always play a very important role in maintaining social 
order and motivating people, and these are its primary values to government.
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Notes on Chapter 6 (Pages 69-74):
® Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash Of Civilizations. (Simon & Schuster, New York, NY, 
1996). Page 301-21.
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Listed in this appendix are ail of the questions from the World Values Survey 
Codebook that were used in the research. In some cases, the questions were modified 
from the way they read in the codebook for clarification. The answers are taken directly 
from the survey, except in cases where the responses were country specific. In those 
cases. I distinguished between Norway and the United States.
Also listed after each question is the code categories used for the purposes of this 
project. In general, the answers were coded with the most conservative or religious 
response as the lowest number (usually one), the moderate answer next (2), than the most 
liberal or irreligious answer (3). The miscellaneous answers and the “Don’t Knows” were 
combined into 9. in order to clean up the data. See Chapter 3 for further information on 
how the questions were used and the reliability of the dummy variables.
Question 1. or V (variable) I, establishes which wave of the survey the 
subsequent data represents. The survey was collected three times, in 1981-82. 1990-91 
and 1995-97.1 did not use this variable, so my data represents a compilation o f all three 
surveys. See Chapter 3 for discussion of this issue.
V2 is a two-digit country code. Nearly 100 countries participated in this survey. I 
used this variable to isolated data from Norway (The country code is 18) and the United 
States (coded 11 ).
V3 is a four-digit interview number that identifies each respondent in the given 
country. I did not use this variable for my project so to include all respondents without 
bias.
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The following are the questions that were used in this research:
V7 Please say, how important is politics in your life?
1 Very important
2 Rather Important
3 Not Very Important
4 Not at all Important
9 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 or 2 = 1, 3 = 2 ,4  = 3, else = 9 (Political Interest)
V9 Please say, how important is religion in your life?
1 Very Important
2 Rather Important
3 Not Very Important
4 Not at all Important
9 Don’t Know
Coded: I or 2 = I, 3 = 2 ,4  = 3. else = 9 (Religiosity)
V28 Are you an active member, and inactive member or not a member of a 
Church or Religious organization?
1 Active Member
2 Inactive Member
3 Don’t Belong
Coded: 1 = I. 2 = 2, 3 = 3. else — 9 (Religiosity)
V37 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss 
political matters:
1 Frequently
2 Occasionally
3 Never
9 Don’t Know
Coded: I = I. 2 = 2, 3 = 3, else =  9 (Political Interest)
V95 If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete
sexual freedom without being restricted would you:
1 Tend to agree
2 Neither/ It depends
3 Tend to disagree
9 Don’t know
Coded: 1 = 3, 2 = 2. 3 = 1, else = 9 (Sexual Ethics)
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V I 17 How interested would you say you are in politics?
1 Very interested
2 Somewhat interested
3 Not very interested
4 Not at all Interested
9 Don’t Know
Coded: I or 2 = 1, 3 = 2 ,4  =  3, else =  9 (Political Interest)
V I23 In political matters, people talk of “the left ” and “the right. ” How would 
you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Left
DK = 99
Coded: 7-10 = 1,4-6 = 2, 1-3 = 3. else = 9
8 9 10
Right
V127
1 2 3 4 5
The government should 
take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for.
7 8 9 10
People should take more 
responsibility to provide 
for themselves.
DK = 99
Coded: 1-3 = 3 ,4-6  = 2, 7-10 = I, else = 9 (Capitalism)
V128
1 2 3 4 5 6
Competition is good.
DK = 99
Coded: 1-3 = 1.4-6 = 2, 7-10 = 3, else = 9 (Capitalism)
7 8 9 10
Competition is harmful.
V129
1 2  3 4
In the long run, hard work 
usually brings a better life. 
(Capitalism)
7 8 9 10
Hard work doesn’t generally 
bring success. It’s more a 
matter o f luck / connections.
V I79 Which, if any, religious denomination do you belong to?
0 No. not a member/ NONE
1 Roman Catholic
2 Mainline Protestant
Here, I created dummy variables to isolate each of these three groups in each of 
the two countries. For example, to isolate Lutherans in Norway. 2 equals 1 and all else 
equals 0. given that V2 equals 18.
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V 181 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days?
1 More than once a week
2 Once a week
3 Once a month
4 Only on special holidays
5 Once a year
6 Less often
7 Never, practically never
Coded; 1 or 2 = 1, 3 thru 5 = 2 ,6  or 7 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)
V 182 Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are:
1 A religious person
2 Not a religious person
3 A convinced atheist
4 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3. else = 9 (Religiosity)
For questions 183-189. the answers and the way I coded the answers are the same. 
Refer to V 183. These made up the Orthodoxy group.
V 183 Do you believe in God?
1 Yes
2 No
9 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 = 1. 2 = 2, else = 9
V 184 Do you believe in life after death?
V I85 Do you believe people have a soul?
V I86 Do you believe the devil exists?
V187 Do you believe in hell?
V I88 Do you believe in heaven?
V189 Do you believe in sin?
V 190 How important is God in your life?
Ï 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ÏÔ
Not at all Very
DK = 99
Coded: 8-10 = I. 3-7 = 2. 1-2 = 3. else = 9 (Religiosity)
V 191 Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?
1 Yes
2 No 
9 DK
Coded: I = 1, 2 =  3. else =  9 (Religiosity)
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For questions 192 though 202, the responses are recorded on the same Likert 
scale. I have coded the scale the same for all o f the questions. Refer to 192 for the scale 
and code. 192-196 made up the Ethics group. 197-200 finished out the Sexual Ethics.
V192 Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled...
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Is Never Justifiable 
DK = 99
Coded: 1-3 = 1,4-6 = 2,7-10 = 3, else =9
Is Always
Justifiable
V 193 Avoiding a fare on public transportation...
V 194 Cheating on your taxes if you have a chance...
V 195 Buying something you knew was stolen...
V 196 Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties...
V197 Homosexuality...
V198 Prostitution...
V199 Abortion...
V200 Divorce...
V201 Euthanasia...
V202 Suicide...
V210 If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list 
would you vote? Or. which one appeals to you the most?
If V2 equals 11. then...
1 Republican
2 Democrat 
9 else
If V2 equals 18. then...
1 Labour
2 Progressive
3 Conservative
4 Christian Peoples
5 Communist
6 Marxist-Leninist
7 Center
8 Socialist
9 Liberal
Here, again, dummy variables were created to isolate constituents of each party. 
Here is how the seven Norwegian political parties currently represented in their 
parliament line up from right to left: Socialist Left, Labor (Norwegian Workers). Liberal. 
Center. Christian People’s. Progressive. Conservative. The party that usually gets the 
most votes is Labor.
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The World Values Survey and European Values Surveys, 1981-84, 1990-93, and 
1995-1997 were produced by the Inter-imiversity Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR). The principal investigators for the ICPSR were Ronald Inglehart, et 
al. from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The codebook includes the questions 
and response codes, a summary o f the project and details on the methodology. The first 
version o f ICPSR 2790 was copyrighted February 2000. The codebook is 178 pages. I 
accessed the data set through SPSS.
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This appendix is a series of tables that show trends in Norway and the United 
States between 1981 and 1995. The aberrations in the 1981 data set also show up here. 
This data has been relegated to an appendix because it is not directly relevant to the study 
and/or the results. However, it is provided in the interest of covering all of the bases.
Table A 1- Norwav Bv Year
Cateeorv 1981 1990 1995
Lutherans (percentage of) 90 86 84
Catholics (percentage of) .3 .8 1
Nones (percentage of) .3 0 9
Religiosity (dununy variable average) 2.22 2.19 2.13
Orthodoxy (dummy variable average) 1.51 1.57 1.54
Homosexuality (attitudes toward average) 1.64 1.74 2.11
Abortion (attitudes toward average) 1.99 1.94 2.12
Table A 2- United States Bv Year
Cateeorv 1981 1990 1995
Mainline Protestants (percentage of) 30 31 35
Catholics (percentage of) 58 28 25
Nones (percentage of) 1 21 19
Religiosity (dummy variable average) 138 1.55 1.44
Orthodoxy (dummy variable average) 1.15 1.17 1.15
Homosexuality (attitudes toward average) 1.32 1.49 1.64
Abortion (attitudes toward average) 1.61 1.72 1.70
All statistics in this appendix are significant to .001 or better. Although 
Americans are getting more religious, their attitudes toward homosexuality and abortion 
are becoming more liberal. The same is true in Norway. The difference is that Americans 
became as liberal toward gays in 1995 as Norwegians were in 1981.
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